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This article explores the relationship between social movements, human rights and law at different scales.  I compare ‘global constitutionalism’ and ‘subaltern cosmopolitanism’ as approaches to movements, rights and law.  As Sociologists we are especially well-placed to address certain assumptions on which these inter-disciplinary approaches rely.  I argue that assumptions about the relationship between social movements and human rights that are fundamentally normative limit our understanding of the diversity of organisational forms through which human rights are being defined, and of the complexity of multi-scalar law through which claims to justice are being made.  In particular, the importance of the state and national law for institutionalising human rights norms should not be neglected by privileging either local or international law as the legitimate focus of democratic claims for justice.  
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This article explores the relationship between social movements, human rights and law at different scales.  As Sociologists we are especially well-placed to address assumptions on which inter-disciplinary approaches to the relationship between movements, rights and law rely.  The article is intended, then, as a theoretical and methodological contribution to the emerging Sociology of human rights.  I argue that assumptions about the relationship between social movements and human rights that are fundamentally normative limit our understanding of the diversity of organisational forms through which human rights are being defined, and of the complexity of multi-scalar law through which claims to justice are being made.  In particular, the importance of the state and national law for institutionalising human rights norms should not be neglected by privileging either local or international law as the legitimate focus for democratic claims-making.  

Social movements are seen as central in two quite different, inter-discipinary, approaches to human rights and law.  ‘Global constitutionalism’ is the view that there is a single human rights movement creating international law.  For ‘subaltern cosmopolitanism’, what is important is the multiplicity of movements and law for progressive human rights.  Mapped onto the popular sociological dichotomy, global constitutionalism is ‘top down’ in comparison with ‘bottom up’ subaltern cosmopolitanism (Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005; Kurasawa 2007; Rajagopal 2003; Stammers 2009).  This spatial metaphor makes some sense because of the relative weight each perspective gives to elites/marginalised groups, and to unified international/pluralised local law.  But in fact both global constitutionalism and subaltern cosmopolitanism rely on an understanding of human rights law as legitimate when it emerges democratically, as a product of popular demands for justice (1).  

In the third edition of their authoritative textbook on international human rights, Steiner, Alston and Goodman confidently assert that: ‘In today’s world, human rights is characteristically imagined as a movement involving international law and institutions, as well as a movement involving the spread of liberal constitutions among states’ (Steiner, Alston and Goodman 2000: 59; see also Mertus 2005; Rajagopal 2009; Bob 2010).  The term ‘movement’ functions in such statements to suggest that, whilst it is undoubtedly bureaucratic elites and professional legal experts who are directly involved in creating international human rights law, it is nevertheless democratic.  International human rights law is understood to be emerging to meet the felt needs of peoples all over the world for dignity, security and justice (2).  It is constructing a global constitution that promises to be universal in practice (and not just in form).  Global constitutionalism seems to be especially relevant when human rights are in question beyond the advanced industrial capitalist societies of European settler states where they became part of political culture, if not always positive law, after the American and French Revolutions of the eighteenth century.  Suspicion of human rights as a form of Western imperialism is met with the idea of a human rights movement, with its connotations of popular participation.  Global constitutionalism theorises the spread of international human rights law as legitimate because it is the product of a global human rights movement rather than of imperialist economic and military power.  

Alternatively, from the perspective of subaltern cosmpolitanism, once we think beyond Western normative theories, we can understand that there is a plurality of human rights movements and of law.  Human rights are taken up in movements that demonstrate a range of knowledges and values with different relationships to law, which can itself be plural and de-institutionalised.  Legal pluralism is important to this perspective: the understanding that a multiplicity of legal orders can co-exist within the same social or political territory.  Globalization is effectively resulting in transnational legal pluralism; a proliferation of forms of legal regulation is emerging at multiple scales, from local, informal mechanisms of dispute resolution in neighbourhood associations, through national and international law, and including transnational law that penetrates national legal fields (Tamahana 2008; Michaels 2009).  For subaltern cosmopolitans, legal pluralism opens up the possibility of alternative forms of legality that can be developed by marginalized and oppressed peoples against hegemonic globalization.  International human rights can be progressive, where they are ‘translated’ into local cultures and become relevant to emancipatory legal practice (Santos 2006: 134-5).  What is most problematic from this perspective is ‘state-centred’ law, which is ‘scientistic’ and rational, imposes Western norms of modernity where they are not appropriate, is alienated from the real needs and desires of ordinary people, and intimidates and suppresses dissent rather than protecting and liberating (Santos 2002a: Chapter 2; 2002b).  For Boaventura De Sousa Santos, law must be developed in close relation to popular social, cultural and economic struggles, rather than, as state-centred law does, standing beyond and above everyday life in a way that favours elites against the people.  To be emancipatory, human rights must become local, living, and counter-hegemonic.  

The study of social movements is well-established in Sociology, so sociologists would seem to be well-placed to study theories of movements in relation to human rights, law and legitimacy.  Are claims for human rights made through social movements?  Are there other types of mobilisation that aim to realise human rights in practice?  What are the differences between them, and do they matter?  In the first section of the article I argue that we know much more about other kinds of networks mobilising for human rights than we do about a global human rights movement.  In the second section, we move on to explore accounts of movements, human rights and law ‘from below’.  Here there is a notable case that does support what subaltern cosmopolitans see as the emancipatory development of human rights, that of the Zapatistas.  But how far is this example notable precisely because it is so rare that human rights are developed outside and against the state?  In the third section I argue that ‘bringing the state back in’ is necessary to explore the rights of communities as well as how conflicts over human rights within communities are adjudicated.  The ‘middle’ of the state is neglected in sociological thinking that contrasts ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ definitions of human rights.  

Movements and other networks
What are social movements? In the first place it is important to bear in mind Alberto Melucci’s methodological injunction against treating movements as if they were actors.  Although it is common to speak of ‘the labour movement’, ‘the women’s movement’, and now ‘the human rights movement’ as doing or saying certain things, movements are not unified, and they can not ‘do’ or ‘say’ anything (Melucci 1989: 24-5).  Following this injunction, Mario Diani’s well-known definition usefully captures what sociologists have understood by ‘social movements’ as consisting in: 
[N]etworks of informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political and/or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity (Diani 1992: 2-3).
	
This definition does, however, raise difficulties.  ‘Networks’ are important to defining social movements and to distinguishing them from other forms of political organisation on the basis that they are more than the hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations they include (the environmental movement is more than Earth First or Friends of the Earth, the gay and lesbian movement is more than the International Lesbian and Gay Association and so on).  But if we now live in a ‘network society’, what does this mean for distinguishing movements as such?  If, across society, networks ‘dissolve centres… disorganize hierarchy, and make materially impossible the exercise of hierarchical power without processing instructions in the network, according to the network’s morphological rules’ (Castells 2000: 19), where does this leave the distinctiveness of social movements?  Stalder glosses Castells’ understanding of networks in contrast to ‘hierarchies’, ‘markets’ and ‘communes’ as consisting of exchanges that are relatively enduring, that have no overarching authority to determine the legitimacy of those interactions, and that are linked by shared protocols and rules (Stadler 2006: 173-81).   Not only are all forms of political action now promoted in terms of networks (consider, for example, political parties making use of social media like Facebook and Twitter), but according to this understanding of social transformation there is no reason to suppose that social movement networks are inherently different or distinct from those of ‘network states’ or ‘network corporations’.  Nor is the difficulty of distinguishing social movements as such resolved if we focus rather on the two other elements by which movements are classically defined: the elaboration of collective identity and participation in conflict.  Many of the networked forms of political action through which activists try to realise human rights could fit this definition.  Should we then understand them as social movements?  

Consider, for example, this quote from a recent analysis of a large NGO: ‘working from the local level upwards, building the awareness and capacity to promote human rights, and joining forces and linking different actors and different levels, are strategies that – when done well – give expression to [the] quest for global equity’ (Brouwer et al. 2005: 76).  The NGO is Oxfam, and the article is considering its work on ‘rights-based development’.   In some ways Oxfam’s activities over the last decade fit very well with sociological understandings of movements.  According to one example Brouwer et al. give of Oxfam’s campaign work to ‘Make Trade Fair’, the organisation has worked with Sahelian cotton farmers, providing research, information, media and networking opportunities for the farmers to make their case at the WTO for lifting domestic subsidies to US producers that make it impossible for them to sell their goods on the world market (page 67-8).  Such activities may be understood as part of a ‘global justice movement’, which constructs a shared project and engages in conflict with powerful states and corporations to redress the balance of power between rich and poor (Della Porta 2007).  But Oxfam is very far from what is generally considered as a social movement organisation.  This is not only because of its size and relative wealth (Oxfam UK had over £60 million in its account in 2010 – and there are numerous ‘national’ Oxfams across the world).  Nor is it because Oxfam originated and remains based in the North.  It is surely much more to do with the focus of such NGOs (which do of course vary in size and scope of action) on outcomes.  They tend to engage people at grassroots, not to define issues and strategies, but to raise support for their own aims or to enhance their expertise in how best to help people.  In ‘rights-based development’ NGOs are now engaged in political conflict - with helping people to change the rules and structures that contribute to their marginalisation (and not, as in an earlier era, with the charitable provision of much needed goods and services).  And they have undoubtedly learned from social movements in their approach to mobilising support and the repertoires of protest they use (publicity stunts to attract media attention such as ‘white band day’, mobilising supporters to demonstrate at meetings of international organisations, use of social media etc).  But the aims of large development NGOs, and the means by which they should be achieved, are set by development experts, not by those who are themselves directly affected by poverty and injustice.  To distinguish this form of political action (without thereby judging its value), from what sociologists mean by ‘social movements’, we might call what development NGOs are involved in ‘human rights development networks’ (see Gready and Ensor 2005; Nelson and Dorsey 2008).  

Social movements are also to be distinguished from another form of political action they closely resemble, ‘transnational advocacy networks’.  A transnational advocacy network ‘includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998a: 3).  These networks are also dominated by big NGOs, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.  Moreover, they are networked into states (linked to progressive political parties, or members of the judiciary, for example), and even multinational corporations (where shareholders try to influence corporate responsibility).  Khagram, Riker and Sikkink distinguish transnational advocacy networks from social movements on the grounds that social movements typically achieve their aims through disruptive collective action, through demonstration and protest, where transnational advocacy networks achieve their aims by reframing issues, altering norms and persuading organisations and governments, especially using ‘shaming’ as a technique to bring about change (Khagam, Riker and Sikkink 2008: 8; Risse et al. 1999).  Keck and Sikkink characterise what transnational advocacy movements do, when they are successful, in terms of the ‘boomerang effect’: as well as putting pressure on states from inside where possible (and in extremely repressive states it may not be possible), domestic NGOs make links to international partners, including INGOs, donors, other states, and IGOs, to put pressure on the state from the outside; where successful, these actors facilitate the demands of the domestic NGOs, which continue (or begin) to put effective pressure on the state from the inside (Keck and Sikkink 1998a: 12-3).  

For Tarrow what distinguishes transnational advocacy networks from transnational social movements is that the latter are clearly (the implication here is ‘deeply’) rooted in networks in more than one state, and are engaged in continuous, not episodic, engagement with at least one state.  Rather than ‘reaching out’ for support beyond the state, they are intrinsically connected across borders.  For Tarrow, transnational advocacy networks may contain social movements, but equally it is quite possible that they are rather distant from activists within states, creating a new professional elite of mobile, educated leaders largely fostered in the North and oriented towards, even dependent on, the international institutions they address (Tarrow 2001).  Whilst Keck and Sikkink assume that transnational advocacy networks are often sustained by social movements, it is actually necessary to investigate the relationship between these two different forms conceptually and empirically (see Keck and Sikkink 1998b).   

One of the factors that characterises social movements, implicit in Diani’s definition insofar as it involves the construction of collective identity, is that individuals and groups, and not just professionals employed by organisations, engage in defining the values with which it is concerned.  They are not just involved in realising goals.  A movement is, in part, a discursive formation.  It is the ongoing product of debates and disagreements, which set an agenda, forming the aims of the movement as well as detailing the means by which those aims are to be achieved.  This aspect of social movements is well captured by Nancy Fraser’s argument that social movements are ‘subaltern counter-public spheres’, where oppositional interpretations of identities, interests and needs are formulated (Fraser 1997).   Another way of putting this is to say that social movements are, by definition, linked to the ‘grassroots’, to people organising informally to address issues that affect them directly (Batliwala 2002).  Social movements need not remain local; indeed, since the nineteenth century they have typically been national.  They are, however, inherently difficult to mobilise and to sustain transnationally.  Digital media and cheap flights have certainly opened up transnational participation in protest events, and it is on this basis that a transnational movement for global justice became very evident around the meetings of the G8 in Seattle, Genoa and elsewhere in the 1990s (Della Porta 2007).  It is, however, turning out to be very difficult to conduct intensive and extensive debates to revise means and ends on the internet, despite the opportunities it appears to offer to do so.  From their study of websites specifically set up to promote political discussion, Cammaerts and van Audenhove found that most contributions came from people who already agreed, and when participation widened to those who did not, the contributions were likely to involve trading insults rather than engaging in mutually respectful debate (Cammaerts and van Audenhove 2005).  Social movements require organisations to link transnationally, but how open are such organisations to the discursive formation of collective identity? How accountable are they to the people they are supposed to represent?

The informal character of social movements at the grassroots makes it difficult to study their relationship to transnational advocacy networks.  As Stammers has argued, there is a tendency in focussing on human rights as international law to study the processes by which human rights are institutionalised (Stammers 1999: 992).  Questions of how issues, conflicts and injustices come to be defined as human rights violations are neglected as a result, as is the study of the organisational forms within which contestation over those definitions takes place.  Consider, for example, Clifford Bob’s excellent article on the Ogoni people and the repression of environmental activists, in which he explicitly sets out to explore the link between local victims and the construction of global human rights issues.  Bob’s focus at the local level is on definitions of human rights articulated by an NGO, the ‘Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People’, which, we are told, was set up by ‘Ogoni elites, led by Ken Saro-Wiwa’ (Bob 2002: 139).  We do not learn how the demands of this organisation came to be formulated in terms of human rights (rather than other values), how it represents the Ogoni people, or how non-elites understand human rights.  The study of grassroots mobilisation is intrinsically difficult.  It requires long-term, in-depth fieldwork, and the development of mobilisations around human rights is difficult to foresee in advance.  Is grassroots mobilisation often facilitated by notions of ‘human rights’?  Are definitions of human rights at the grassroots similar to those we find in international human rights agreements?  How are they different?  How do uses of human rights at the grassroots relate, if at all, to legal reform?  And when they do, what kind of legal reform is demanded? (3)  

Law ‘from below’?
For global constitutionalists, international human rights law is legitimate because it responds to the felt needs of human beings. In this respect, global constitutionalism reflects the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is founded, according to its Preamble, on the supposition that ‘the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people’.  We cannot assume, however, that transnational advocacy networks are addressing the demands or needs ‘of the common people’ by developing international human rights law given that we know so little about how transnational advocacy networks are linked to grassroots, even where research is concerned with local communities.  In the absence of such research we cannot conclude that international human rights law is a legitimate democratic global constitution in the making. 

From the point of view of subaltern cosmopolitanism, the radical democratic answer to the question, ‘how do human rights claims become legitimate law?’ is ‘legal pluralism’ that displaces state-centred law.  Broadly speaking, ‘legal pluralism’ simply refers to ‘a multiplicity of legal orders’ within a single social field or political unit (Tamanaha 2008: 375).  Although, as Brian Tamanaha demonstrates, ‘legal pluralism’ was a feature of medieval Europe, it became associated with the global South because of the way Europeans governed colonies by accommodating and relying on existing forms of authority, including so-called ‘native courts’ that enforced customary or religious laws.  In many places the result was a dual legal system: legal norms were applied to economic and government affairs through state courts, while officially recognised customary and religious courts and authorities dealt with family and ‘local’ matters (Tamanaha 2008: 382).  Legal pluralism continued following decolonization, so that it is a feature of many countries today.  A recent report for the International Council on Human Rights Policy gives the following example: ‘[I]f a member of a peasant community in the Department of Ayacucho, Peru, is involved in a dispute, she can resort to the authorities of her own peasant comunidad, to the local Justice of the Peace, to an NGO-based Rural Centre for the Administration of Justice, or to the state courts’ (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2009: 2). (4)   

Legal pluralism is what makes emancipatory law possible for subaltern cosmopolitans.  National state law - which is what we ordinarily think of as law in highly industrialised societies - is problematic insofar as it turns law into a science that is inaccessible to the majority of the people.  Emancipatory law, Santos argues, does not separate state and society (Santos 2002a: 14-9).  It emerges from the lived experience of marginalised, oppressed and impoverished groups who, if they are not necessarily in the literal global South, are nevertheless in the ‘South of the imagination’, that of subordinated peoples across the world (Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005: 14).  To develop his model of emancipatory law Santos extrapolates from his research on the Residents’ Association in Paradagas, a favela in Rio, and the way in which it managed disputes over contracts and land (Santos 2002a: 158-62).  As local law, it is embedded in the everyday life of the community, serving the interests and values of those who elaborated it.  It is local, participatory, accessible and consensual.  Ultimately, emancipatory law pluralises and decentres the state, which is absorbed into, rather than standing over and above, local legal practices.  In fact, for Santos, the state itself must become ‘the newest social movement’, losing its monopoly of meta-regulation and becoming dissolved into emancipatory struggles for democratic participation (Santos 2002a: 489-93).  

In order to be emancipatory, however, Santos argues that law must also be counter-hegemonic.  It must be developed in ways that enable people to determine the conditions of their own lives, resisting multinational corporations, capitalist commodification, and the domination of elites, as well as dealing with power relations based on inequalities of wealth and status within communities.  It is in this respect that Santos sees uses of international human rights as potentially progressive.  Legal pluralism is no longer just intra-state.  ‘Transnational legal pluralism’ means the co-existence of overlapping local, national and international law within and across states.  In such a situation, international human rights, which Santos sees as the product of transnational coalitions of NGOs (or transnational advocacy networks) that aim to reduce suffering (Santos 2002a: 257), may be found to be useful in local contexts.  Human rights may encourage progressive interpretations of existing traditions (Santos gives the example of women’s status in Sharia law) (Santos 2002b: 50-2).  But it works the other way too.  Local understandings usefully contribute to the development of progressive, multicultural human rights, as a result of cross-cultural dialogue between subalterns (Santos 2002b).  ‘Subaltern cosmopolitanism’ involves emancipatory legal practices at the local level and translocal dialogue to develop counter-hegemonic politics.  In both respects, creative uses of international human rights may have a progressive part to play.  

In terms of empirical research, the best example of subaltern cosmopolitanism is the Zapatista movement from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.  In Rights in Rebellion Sharon Speed shows how, from demanding respect for human rights from the Mexican state, including self-rule for the Chiapas region, the Zapatistas developed practices of rights in autonomous forms of participatory governance (rather than conceiving of rights as being granted by states or international agencies) (Speed 2008).  For Santos, at this time the Zapatistas were exemplary because their conception of rights was radically inclusive of all forms of inequality (social and economic as well as civil and political); they tried to take all forms of oppression into account (of workers but also of women, lesbians and gay men, indigenous peoples and so on); and (unlike previous revolutionary movements) they did not seek to ‘take power’ (through the state) but rather to create a fundamentally new world beginning from ‘where we are’ by contesting relations of power in everyday practices (Santos 2002a: 459-65).  Their creative use of human rights enabled the Zapatistas to develop local forms of governance outside state-centred law, close to lived experience and progressive in relation to diverse forms of inequality and domination.

Perhaps, however, the Zapatistas are both an excellent example of subaltern cosmopolitanism, and at the same time a limit case of what this perspective can offer our understanding of the development of legitimate human rights law?  The Zapatistas are an excellent example of the progressive use of human rights from the perspective of subaltern cosmopolitanism.  Not only did they develop local human rights law, but the movement has also been celebrated for its innovative use of new technology to engage people from across the world with its approach to emancipatory politics and human rights (Castells 1997: 79-83).  The significance of the Zapatistas in this respect is illuminated in important ways by the focus of subaltern cosmopolitanism on local, counter-hegemonic uses of human rights.  On the other hand, the Zapatistas seem to have been exceptional, if not unique, in using the language of human rights explicitly outside (and therefore, by implication, against) the national state.  I know of no other case of this kind – though Santos and Rodriguez-Garcia have compiled an edited collection of case studies that explore possibilities of subaltern cosmopolitanism (Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005).  This is not surprising when we consider that human rights law tends to be state-centred.  For subaltern cosmopolitanism, state-centred law is illegitimate, alienating and de-politicising.  But in ‘actually existing’ international human rights law, it is states that are supposed to guarantee and enforce human rights – not just across national territories, but also for, within, and even against local communities. 

Bringing the state back in
The international human rights regime is state-centric.  It is state actors that sign and ratify international human rights agreements, that commit to respecting and enforcing human rights within their territories (against their own violations), and that submit to (or evade) being monitored and judged by UN agencies in terms of their compliance with those agreements. Ultimately too, it is states that donate the resources to set up international courts and commissions, and – exceptionally, in very extreme cases – invite or allow external agencies to monitor, administer and enforce law within their territories (Donnelly 2003: 33-7).  The UN human rights system is designed to maintain state sovereignty, even though sovereignty is at the same time problematized as respect for individual rights within states is encoded in international human rights law (Douzinas 2007: 244; see Nash 2010: 71-4).  

In our world, in which every inch of the Earth is ‘territory’ under the jurisdiction of a state, the ‘autonomous spaces’ of subaltern cosmopolitanism themselves depend on state-centred law.   They are invariably negotiated with states, which are often geographically and politically distant from the everyday concerns of local communities, but which cannot be ignored when human rights are brought into question.  Take, for example, the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007, which addresses the state as the guarantor of trans-local community rights.  The Declaration allows for equality, non-discrimination and ‘self-determination’ - not ‘sovereignty’ - for indigenous peoples.  As one participant-observer argues, the Declaration seeks to assist states in the implementation of the indigenous right to self-determination within a democratic system without disrupting public institutions or the rule of law.  Nevertheless, she suggests that the Declaration is of practical use, and it is widely supported by the leaders of indigenous groups, who worked hard to negotiate it at the UN (Davis 2008).

We might also consider claims to justice on the part of ‘subalterns within the subaltern’.  It is in clashes that arise between the ‘rights of peoples’, the paradigm on which autonomous legal forms are based (often thought of in terms of ‘rights to culture’), and the ‘rights of individuals’ within those collectivities, that the importance of state authorities that are called on to adjudicate between them becomes most evident.  As it is through the state that human rights obligations are encoded in international human rights law, state-centred law becomes the target of human rights activists and the site of claims for justice ‘from below’.  

Probably the most celebrated case of a clash between community and individual rights is Lovelace v Canada, which was decided by the UN Human Rights Committee in 1981 (see Bafesky 1982; Clavero 1999).  It exemplifies the complications and contradictions of human rights law ‘from below’ and the role of the state in adjudicating them.  Sandra Lovelace, a member of the Maliseet tribe and an activist for aboriginal and women’s rights, petitioned the UN Human Rights Committee to prevent her tribe revoking the Indian status of any woman who married outside of it, as well as that of her children.  This was clearly an issue of gender discrimination, since the same rule did not apply to men.  But it was also an issue for the tribe too: what was at stake was losing rights to autonomous self-organisation, and potentially loss of identity too as the scope of those who were free to marry outside the tribe was widened.  Eventually the Human Rights Committee ruled that the Canadian government must enable Lovelace’s right to practice her culture as a member of a minority according to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Canada was bound as a signatory state.  Eventually, in 1985, despite protests from tribe leaders, the Canadian government amended the Indian Act to end gender discrimination in native law.  In other words, although persuaded to do so by the UN, ultimately it was the Canadian state that made law in this case, changing legislation to prevent the victimisation of women by over-ruling Indian autonomy over the customary regulation of marriage (and by implication some aspects of tribal identity).      

Of course, one of the main points of entry for the sociology of human rights is that calling on state-centred law is often unsuccessful, even when states have bound themselves in international human rights law.  A very interesting example that contrasts with the success of Lovelace’s rights-claim comes from Jean Jackson’s work in Columbia, where judges have, on occasion, decided for local communities against international human rights law (Jackson 2007).  According to the Columbian constitution of 1991, as elsewhere in Latin America, the state recognises and protects ethnic diversity.  Councils within indigenous communities in Columbia have won rights to administer customary law, and they sometimes administer punishments, such as whippings or putting people in stocks, that are not acceptable in national or international human rights law.  Indeed, in international human rights law such punishments may be considered ‘cruel and unusual’, and even to amount to torture.  In cases that have gone to national courts, however, judges have sometimes been sympathetic to the councils recommending these punishments, in part because advocates for indigenous self-government argue that they better fit the ways of life customary to the pueblos (where isolating an individual by jailing them might itself be a cruel and unusual punishment, for example).  This was the judgement, for example, in the Guempel case, in which Amnesty International intervened, where the Columbian Constitutional Court ruled that definitions of human rights are not universal, but contextual, and that whipping as a punishment did not, in this case, amount to torture (Jackson 2007: 215-221).  

‘Bringing the state back in’ may seem to simplify the relationship between social movements and human rights law.  If democratic states are the ultimate guarantors of human rights, it is state legitimacy that matters, governments and judiciaries should administer human rights in national settings and activists should demand justice there.  But of course things are not so straightforward.  ‘Bringing the state back in’ adds to rather than reduces the complexity of human rights law.  States are the principal guarantors of international human rights, and the principal addressees of human rights activists, but how human rights are interpreted and used is not thereby restricted to the national setting.  On the contrary, as part of transnational legal pluralism, human rights law is multi-scalar.  Not only can there be more than one jurisdiction through which individuals may claim rights, but there is not necessarily any ultimate judicial authority to adjudicate conflicts.  We see this complexity clearly in the Lovelace and Guempel cases where there were overlapping jurisdictions through which human rights could be claimed within and above the state.  Generally, as in Columbia and Canada, the primacy of national law is built into the constitution that grants ‘rights to culture’ to indigenous peoples.  Nevertheless, as we have seen, state law does not automatically trump local customary law, even when priorities are clear in legal doctrine and national courts become involved.  

Nor does international law automatically trump state law.  Although international human rights law is negotiated to make clear requirements of states that have signed treaties and conventions, so that it seems as if the UN is above them as a judicial authority, it is not an authority that can be enforced.  The force of the UN Human Rights Committee is ‘soft’, moral and political, not the ‘hard’ force of the police and military.  Especially where the value of state sovereignty is seen to be at stake, the status of international human rights law as such is often contested, as well as the sites at which definitive judicial decisions may be made, how human rights should be administered and enforced, and even the relevant subjects (citizens, communities, individuals) for whom justice must be seen to be done (see Nash 2009).  (5)  

Finally, the fact that international law can only be enforced through states makes for complexity because, although international human rights law constructs signatory states as identical in their possession of sovereignty, in reality they differ enormously.  States have been formed very differently historically, and they do not all resemble the ideal-type of the juridical state presupposed by international human rights law.  In many cases fundamental social, economic and political restructuring would be necessary to enable states to administer law in a way that would guarantee human rights (see Nash 2011).  Interestingly, the difficulty of administering state law in Columbia, where guerrilla warfare and drug traffickers have been terrorising rural communities for decades, seems to have been one of the main reasons for the determination of indigenous peoples to win rights to administer punishment according to customary law in the Guempel case (Jackson 2007: 220).  Where the state does not in fact monopolise violence, and summary justice as part of gang warfare is the real alternative, local customary law may be all the more valuable.   

Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that there is a lack of empirical research to substantiate the assumption that international human rights law is the chosen solution of ‘common people’ (in the words of the UDHR), who are in agreement that this is the best way to achieve dignity and security.  We simply don’t know enough about how people outside NGOs conceive of human rights where their dignity and security is at stake.  ‘Global constitutionalism’ is, therefore, unsatisfactory as a legitimation of human rights law.  Those who study human rights from disciplinary backgrounds in legal theory and International Relations may be satisfied with thinking of activist and/or development networks as social movements, but unpacking what this means in sociological terms should give us pause for thought.  We might look more deeply into the question of whether and how connections are made and maintained between transnational networks and grassroots understandings of human rights.  But grassroots mobilisations are inherently difficult to study, and their study may not always prove interesting compared to the focus sociologists are inclined to adopt on the institutionalisation of human rights.  Grassroots mobilisations may create definitions of human rights that are significantly different from mainstream legal understandings (as in the example of the Zapatistas), which may be productive of radical political agendas compared to those of transnational advocacy or development networks.  On the other hand, locally created definitions may simply prove unsustainable, and ultimately unproductive of alternatives.  An easier, and possibly more promising, solution, then, is to be clear about the difficulties of creating transnational social movements, and to avoid using the term to analyse what are actually quite different organisational forms.  In this case, however, we should also be clear that we are challenging, rather than supporting, the assumption that international human rights law is democratically legitimate because it is being demanded by ‘common people’.   

In terms of a multiplicity of movements demanding human rights ‘from below’, I have argued specifically against proponents of subaltern cosmopolitanism that we cannot avoid or ignore the state as it is currently constructed in international law as the guarantor of human rights.  Human rights law is state-centric in that it is virtually exclusively through states that international human rights law is made and enforced.  Even when we consider human rights that are genuinely demanded ‘from below’, the state is the most obvious addressee of such demands.  Far from reducing the complexity of our task, however, ‘bringing the state back in’ means taking on the study of law that is multi-scalar, contradictory, incomplete, and only partially administered even where states have committed themselves to upholding human rights principles.  In practice, in the complex interplay of definitions of human rights on the part of activists, lawyers and politicians at national and international level, what human rights mean in practice will, for the foreseeable future, involve a patchwork of legal victories, compromises, temporary solutions, and political trade-offs.  

I have argued here that building in assumptions about how the legitimacy of human rights law is achieved is unhelpful to developing the sociology of human rights.  It is understandable that assumptions about the legitimacy of human rights law are made in that many of us who work in this area feel broadly sympathetic, hopeful, even passionate about the potential of human rights to bring about justice (Blau and Moncado 2007; Somers 2008; Turner 2006).  The institutionalisation of human rights through law is undoubtedly an important part of that potential.  But simplifying the relationship between social movements, human rights, and law to fit normative commitments will not help us understand how human rights are actually being developed and institutionalised.  What is needed are theories and methodologies that enable analysis of the diversity of organisational forms through which human rights are being defined and claimed, and the complexity of the multi-scalar law through which they are being (partially and controversially) institutionalised.  We need research agendas that do not over-simplify the field we are studying.  It is surely only on this basis that we can contribute as sociologists to advancing human rights. 

Notes
1.	There are, of course, other possible sources of legal legitimacy (see Weber 1978 for the classic sociological discussion; also Albrow 1990; Turner 1984).  But these contemporary approaches to human rights see human rights law as legitimate only when it is the product of demands for justice.  

2.	The flip side of this optimistic view is that of critics who take a human rights movement to be reinforcing elite hegemony rather than as legitimating rights for all.  David Kennedy, for example, sees the human rights movement as caught in a series of traps that limit political imagination and action through an overestimation of the value and power of international law (Kennedy 2002).  According to this view, the human rights movement consolidates global elites, putting too much faith in lawyers and procedures rather than challenging grossly unequal relations of power and voice through struggles to articulate more utopian visions. The point here is that Kennedy shares the view that there is a human rights movement.

3.	In their study of local mobilisations for equal rights in New York City, Sally Engle Merry and her colleagues found that grassroots activists did define human rights differently from the lawyers they worked with, stressing values of human dignity over norms of governance, and linking them with ideas from the women’s movement, and national and religious ideologies (Merry et al. 2010; Rosen and Yoon 2009).  Donatella Della Porta and her colleagues have also studied, quantitatively, how important ‘human rights’ are as values to the global justice movement (Della Porta 2007).  I know of no work, however, that looks at what human rights actually mean to these activists. 

4.	In the UK the question of legal pluralism in this respect arises particularly in relation to religious law, with recent controversies raised around Sharia law for Muslims.  See the special section of Ecclesiastical Law Journal 2008 10/3 on the debate over whether restricting Sharia law is legitimate and/or practical in the UK.   

5.	The current politics of human rights in the UK, where the scope and content of human rights law is being investigated by a Commission on a Bill of Rights, may be extreme rather than exceptional.  Many of the issues the Commission is addressing concerning the legitimacy of national and international judicial bodies and decision-making arise because of transnational legal pluralism, which makes for similar issues around the world.   
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